Take a stand against Islamic radicalism in Egypt

It seems contradictory when freedom’s proponents take sides with the military to force an elected government from power. But when that government has become an instrument of oppression, then, as the Declaration of Independence says, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.” Having the military on your side means the difference between a successful revolution and facing beheading for treason.

Last week, Egypt’s Islamist president Mohamed Morsi was ejected from office in what his supporters called a coup, and opponents called a popular revolt. Days later, events are quickly overcoming that semantic debate. The coalition that forced the Muslim Brotherhood from power has fractured, and the growing violence in Egyptian streets points towards chronic strife or civil war. Islamists lack the power to force a solution to the crisis, but they have enough muscle to initiate an insurgency, perhaps following the Algerian model. There, a conflict raged for eight years between the military government and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), after pro-Islamist election results were annulled in 1991. A word of caution for the Brothers – the FIS lost.

The Muslim Brotherhood had been playing a deceitful game in its quest to impose hard-line Islamist rule in the most populous Arab state. The Brothers had lied about their intentions for Egypt from the start of the Arab Spring. They said they were not going to be involved in politics, but only render spiritual advice. They pledged they would not organize a political party or field candidates. They said they would craft an inclusive, liberal constitution. They said the rights of women, religious minorities, journalists and political opponents would be protected. They said Egypt would prosper under their leadership. All of this was untrue.

Morsi’s overreach was bound to court reaction; it was only a matter of when. The Egyptian military is the best organized, most competent and most pro-western institution in the country (which admittedly isn’t saying much). However, it would not act without strong public support. It needed the legitimacy of a popular uprising. This was particularly important given the Obama administration’s apparent affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. The generals could not risk having the American military aid lifeline cut. However, they could count on President Obama’s characteristic lack of initiative in a crisis. Once the uprising was on, all they needed was an opportunity. With Mr. Obama touring Africa and John Kerry ensconced on his yacht, the time was right, and they moved. The White House response was nothing if not consistent; it had done nothing to help erstwhile American ally Hosni Mubarak when his regime fell in 2011, and did just as little to save Mohamed Morsi.

The administration is now trying tepidly to shape events in Egypt, mostly by not taking sides. Mr. Obama “condemned the ongoing violence across Egypt and expressed concern over the continued political polarization.” Mr. Kerry firmly rejected the “unfounded and false claims by some in Egypt that the United States supports the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or any specific Egyptian political party or movement.” The White House said it wants an “inclusive” political process moving forward, which is more than what it was getting from the Muslim Brotherhood. But White House spokesman Jay Carney said the administration was wary of moving “unnecessarily quickly” on Egypt.

But events in Egypt are not waiting on the White House. Just as Washington was talking reconciliation, the Nour party, the second largest party in Egypt and more radical than the Muslim Brothers, withdrew from talks on setting up a new government. The party said this was to protest soldiers killing at least 35 pro-Morsi demonstrators in street violence on Monday. So far, the revolution is a win-win for the Nour party: they sided with the military to dislodge their Muslim Brotherhood competitors from power, thus escaping being caught up in the dragnet; and can now skip back into the opposition to organize Islamist resistance to the new provisional government. The radicals are thinking two moves ahead while the White House struggles to lead from behind.

The administration can condemn violence, express concern, be deeply troubled, and other such things, but it will have no impact on resolving the growing crisis in Egypt. The White House has managed to alienate both sides of the revolution. Favorability towards the United States is lower now than it was in the final year of the George W. Bush administration. Demonstrators in the streets carried explicitly anti-Obama signs. Seventy-two percent of Egyptians have no confidence in Barack Obama.

However, the Egyptian military’s favorability rating is 73%. The smartest move at this point would be to signal the generals that they should do what they need to do to maintain order and stave off chaos. This type of unambiguous message would place the United States squarely on the side of the most popular, legitimate institution in Egyptian society, and tell the Islamist radicals there is no future in counter-revolution. It is also the only chance for the smaller, secular, liberal parties to help chart a future for Egypt. The administration should stop romanticizing what it calls “legitimate Islamism” and take a solid stand for freedom. There are worse outcomes than a transitional, military-backed secular government in Cairo. Unfortunately these days, with the potential for civil war or the resurgence of even harsher Islamist rule, it seems like the best outcome possible.

James S. Robbins is Deputy Editor of Rare and author of Native Americans: Patriotism, Exceptionalism, and the New American Identity. Follow him on Twitter @James_Robbins